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Abstract 
 
 
Many studies have analyzed empirically the determinants of survival for innovative startup 
companies using data about the characteristics of entrepreneurs and management or focusing on 
firm- and industry-specific variables. However, no attempts have been made so far to assess the role 
of the environmental sustainability of the production process. Based on data describing the 
characteristics of the Italian innovative startups in the period 2009-2018, this article studies the 
differences in survival between green and non-green companies. We show that, while controlling 
for other confounding factors, startups characterized by a green production process tend to survive 
longer than their counterparts. In particular, we estimate that a green innovative startup is more than 
twice as likely to survive than a non-green one. This evidence may support the idea that environment 
sustainability can help economic development. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Innovation has always been a distinguishing activity of humanity. From the wheel to the invention 
of the world wide web, it constitutes an indissoluble common thread, inherent in human nature itself. 
Innovation is also crucial for economic growth and sustainability. Following the growing pressure 
brought about by international competition, it is now a duty for companies and modern nations to 
innovate. An important component of the engine of innovation is to be found in startup companies. 
The term startup appears for the first time on Forbes in 1976 (Forbes, 1976) to indicate a new type of 
company and not an embryonic phase of the life of incumbent companies. Since then, the attention 
on the topic has been growing due to the occurrence of positive association among new business 
initiatives, innovation rate and economic growth (see, among others, Kirchhoff et al., 2007; Baptista 
et al., 2008; Bygrave et al., 2003; Colombelli et al., 2016) 
Startups may stimulate economies by promoting innovation (Audretsch, 1995; Reynolds, 1997). 
The most innovative ones often report better performances (Vivarelli and Audretsch, 1998), 
contribute positively to the generation of new jobs and to the development of new sectors (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1987; Shearman and Burrell, 1988), and, more in general, fuel an overall improvement of 
the welfare system (Birch, 1979, 1987; Phillips and Kirchhoff, 1989; Rickne and Jacobsson, 1999).  
Despite their contribution to innovation and economic development, startups often struggle to 
survive for a long time in the market, because of the higher difficulties they face, especially at the 
beginning of their business activity. The greatest problem that newborn companies deal with concern 
the so-called liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), which is usually associated with the scarcity 
of resources that new entries have access to start and develop the business. Indeed, some balance 
sheet indicators, such as a consistent liquidity, very low leverage ratio and the ability to make profits, 
have been shown to be important predictors of success or failure of a startup, especially in the 
preliminary stages of its life (Wiklund et al., 2010). Other features that may affect the positive result 
of a newborn business activity concern the characteristics of the entrepreneur, e.g. his/her previous 
work experiences in the business world (Lazear, 2004; Dahl and Reichstein, 2007) or his/her ability 
to cooperate (Eisenhardt, Schoonhoven, 1990). As a result, newborn companies, and hence startups, 
may experience high failure rates (Shapero and Giglierano, 1982), especially those that reproduce 
existing products (Finaldi Russo et al., 2016). 
Recently, innovation has been increasingly dedicated to problem of using and searching for 
alternative energy sources to mitigate the impact of human activities on Earth, according to the so-
called green economy. Indeed, pursuing a sustainable development is more and more a global issue 
(Finnegan et al., 2018; Garbasso, 2014; Crespi et al., 2015).  
Thus, when the will to innovate meets the need to pursue sustainability, innovative startups play 
a crucial role (Iazzolino et al., 2019). Given that, it is reasonable to expect some form of attention and 
protection by the policy maker aimed at promoting the development of new business initiatives 
focused on technological sustainable innovation. Some studies have reported evidences that seem to 
validate this assumption (e.g. Söderblom and Samuelsson, 2014). The goal of policy makers is to 
intensify technology transfer and market competition to speed up the evolution of the industrial 
network and hence to increase the production and the employment (Autio and Parhankangas, 1998; 
Ejermo and Xiao, 2014; Storey and Tether, 1998). In particular, it has been shown that sustainability-
oriented technologies offer the opportunity to restore competitiveness in western saturated mature 
economies (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009; Costantini et al., 2013; Gilli et al. 2014). Indeed, in the last 
years, the green economy has been one of the best responses to the economic crisis. Not surprisingly, 
also startups have been interested by green consciousness, given the possibility to receive additional 
benefits if adopting environmental ethics. 
 However, while it is true that companies devoted to a sustainable production have recently gain 
an increase in growth, this not necessarily goes along with the probability to survive in the market, 
which should be a central topic for startups. Although several contributions in literature addressed 
the issue of identifying the factors of survival (e.g. Arbia et al., 2017) and development of young 
innovative companies (e.g. Giraudo et al., 2019), few studies have focused on investigating the link 
between sustainable development and neo-entrepreneurial activity (Schick, et al., 2002).  
This paper aims at filling this gap in the literature by assessing whether and how the risk of market 
exit that innovative startups face is affected by the environmental sustainability of their production 
process. In particular, exploiting data about the population of Italian innovative startups in the period 
2009-2018 and by means of the Cox proportional-hazard model, we verify that green startups have a 
relatively higher survival performance compared to the non-green ones, while controlling for other 
structural factors that influence firm survival.  
The paper is structured as follow. Section 2 briefly describe the current Italian legislative 
framework of innovative startups, that is the Italian Startup Act. In Section 3, the statistical framework 
is presented. In Section 4 the dataset about Italian innovative startups on which the analyses are 
conducted is presented, and interesting insights are brought to light. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The Italian legislative framework of innovative startups: the “Startup Act” 
 
At the end of 2012 the Italian government decided to intervene to improve the context for the 
birth and growth of newborn companies through the so-called Italian Startup Act (Law no. 221/2012), 
which introduces the definition of a new innovative company in the Italian legal system, namely the 
innovative startup (hereinafter ISU). Requirements to be considered ISU are related to the nationality 
(being registered in Italy or in another EU country but with a production branch in Italy), age (aged 
less than 5 years) and core business (which must be centered on research, development, production, 
marketing of innovative products with high technological value) of the company. In addition, ISUs 
must satisfy at least two of three additional requirements, such as: expenses in R&D and innovation 
must be at least 15% of either its annual costs or its turnover; employs highly qualified personnel, 
such as at least one third of PhD holders and students, or researchers, or at least two third of M.Sc. 
graduates; be the owner, depositary or licensee of a registered patent, or the owner of a registered 
software (Ministry of Economic Development, 2019). Newborn companies respecting these 
requirements may be registered in the special section for innovative startups of the Italian Business 
Register. The aim of the Italian legislator was clearly the creation of an environment for the 
development of new entrepreneurial ideas with a highly innovative character. So that, the possibility 
to be defined ISUs was contemplated also for companies that comply with the requirements for a 
period (i) not exceeding four years, if the company was born up to 2 years before entry into force, (ii) 
not exceeding three years, if established between 2009 and 2010, and (iii) up to two years, if registered 
in the Italian Business Register between 2008 and 2009. Companies falling into definition of ISUs 
may enjoy a substantial number of concessions, going from the purely bureaucratic sphere to tax, 
financing and governance grants. Examples of the first are the cut of many red tape rules and 
exemption to pay annual fees and duty stamps, while examples of the second are tax incentives for 
equity investors, an easier compensation of VAT credits, the extension of terms to cover systematic 
losses, a flexible corporate managing, tailor-made labor laws, remuneration of employees and 
consultants through stock options and work for equity (not included in taxable income), not 
compulsory operationality tests to verify the inactivity status, facilitated and speed-up bankruptcy 
procedures, and many others (Finaldi Russo et al., 2016; Ministry of Economic Development, 2019).  
The Italian regulation on ISUs provides a particular kind of innovative startup defined as “high 
technological value companies in energy related fields”. These companies are intended as green 
startups (in contrast with non-green startups), which shall establish green oriented activities, 
regardless of their specific sectors of activity. Business literature and empirical evidences show that 
nowadays sustainability and innovation go hand in hand and feed into themselves. Adopting a green 
approach means, for newborn companies, to transform initial difficulties into opportunities. Although 
Italy has been lagging in the green transition, the last GreenItaly report (Unioncamere and Fondazione 
Symbola, 2019) has pointed out that the 31.2% of the entire non-agricultural entrepreneurship has 
invested in the period 2015-2018, or plan to invest by the end of 2019, in green products and 
technologies in order to reduce the environmental impact, save energy and curbing CO2 emissions. 
Therefore, we argue that the innovative startups belonging to this class can be properly considered as 
green as opposed to the non-green ones. This categorization can then help in assessing whether 
greenness positively affects the survival performance of innovative startups.    
 
 
3. Empirical methodology: survival analysis 
 
The proper empirical methodology to assess the determinants of survival time of a company, that 
is the time occurring between the entry of a company into the market and its exit from the market, is 
the so-called survival (or duration) analysis. Unlike the more traditional regression modelling 
approaches, such as the logistic regression, survival analysis can specifically deal with the inevitable 
occurrence of censoring, that is the presence of truncated observations due to the fact that the actual 
survival time of a company can be longer than its observed follow-up time. In particular, in order to 
study the relationship between company survival performance and greenness in production, we 
employ Kaplan-Meier curves and the Cox proportional hazards regression model. 
 
3.1 Descriptive survival analysis: the Kaplan-Meier curves   
 
Following the approach by Kaplan and Meier (1958), it is possible to estimate the company 
survival probability non-parametrically using the observed survival times, both censored and 
uncensored, of each company.  
Let consider that 𝑘 companies cease to operate during the time interval under observation at 
distinct points in time 𝑡ଵ < 𝑡ଶ < 𝑡ଷ < ⋯ < 𝑡௞. Assuming that exit of companies from the market 
occur independently of one another, the probabilities of surviving from a point in time to the 
successive one can be multiplied together to give the cumulative survival probability. In other words, 
the probability that a company is still on the market at 𝑡௝, say 𝑆൫𝑡௝൯, can be calculated from 𝑆൫𝑡௝ିଵ൯ 
as follows: 
 
𝑆൫𝑡௝൯ = 𝑆൫𝑡௝ିଵ൯ ൬1 −
ௗೕ
௡ೕ
൰, 
 
where 𝑛௝  is the number of companies still being on the market just before 𝑡௝ and 𝑑௝  represents the 
number of companies that exit from market at 𝑡௝. Obviously, since 𝑡଴ = 0, then 𝑆(0) = 1. The value 
of 𝑆(𝑡) is necessarily constant between successive points in times thus implying that the estimated 
probability is a step function that varies only at the point in time of each exit. The Kaplan-Meier 
(hereinafter KM) survival curve is the plot of  𝑆(𝑡) against 𝑡 and may provide a useful summary of 
the survival performance of companies.  
In addition, the comparison between the KM curves of different subgroups of companies, such 
as the groups of green and non-green startups, allows to identify the presence of factors affecting the 
survival. Indeed, it is possible to test the statistical significance of the difference between the survival 
curves of different groups through the log-rank test (Peto et al., 1977). This test is based on the 
computation, for each group, of the expected number of companies that cease to operate at each point 
in time, since the previous one, under the null hypothesis of no difference between groups. For each 
𝑖-th group, the sum of these values across all points in time provides the total expected number of 
companies’ exits, say 𝐸௜. The log-rank test summarizes the discrepancies between the observed 
number of companies’ exits in each group, say 𝑂௜, and 𝐸௜ by means of the following test statistic, 
 
𝜒ଶ = ∑ (ை೔ିா೔)
మ
ா೔
௚
௜ୀଵ . 
 
Under the null hypothesis of no difference between the survival curves of the groups, the 𝜒ଶ test 
statistic follows a Chi-square distribution with (𝑔 − 1) degrees of freedom, where 𝑔 is the number 
of groups.  
 
3.2 Survival regression modelling: the Cox proportional hazards model   
 
Regression methods for survival time data attempt to model the relationship between one or more 
regressors and the so-called hazard function 𝜆௜(𝑡), which in this empirical context denotes the 
instantaneous exit rate for company 𝑖 surviving to time 𝑡. Consequently, 𝜆௜(𝑡)d𝑡 gives the probability 
of company 𝑖 to exit from market at time 𝑡, given that it survived until time 𝑡. Unlike other parametric 
survival regression models, which require to specify a functional form for 𝜆௜(𝑡), the semi-parametric 
Cox proportional-hazards model (Cox, 1972) does not require to make any distributional assumption. 
Under this model, the hazard function for company 𝑖 varies according to time 𝑡 and 𝑘 regressors 
(𝑥ଵ, 𝑥ଶ, … , 𝑥௞) as follows: 
 
𝜆௜(𝑡) = 𝜆଴(𝑡)exp(𝛽ଵ𝑥ଵ௜ + 𝛽ଶ𝑥ଶ௜ + ⋯ + 𝛽௞𝑥௞௜) 
 
where 𝜆଴(𝑡) represents the baseline hazard and 𝛽ଵ, 𝛽ଶ, … , 𝛽௞ are unknown parameters that need 
to be estimated. In this formulation there is no need to specify the functional form of 𝜆଴(𝑡) since it is 
assumed to be common among all companies. Indeed, the ratio between the hazards of any two 
generic companies 𝑖 and 𝑙 is 
 
𝜆௜(𝑡)
𝜆௟(𝑡)
=
𝜆଴(𝑡) exp(𝛽ଵ𝑥ଵ௜ + ⋯ + 𝛽௞𝑥௞௜)
𝜆଴(𝑡) exp(𝛽ଵ𝑥ଵ௟ + ⋯ + 𝛽௞𝑥௞௟)
= exp[𝛽ଵ(𝑥ଵ௜ − 𝑥ଵ௟) + ⋯ + 𝛽௞(𝑥௞௜ − 𝑥௞௟)] 
 
and, therefore, it does not depend on neither 𝑡 nor 𝜆଴(⋅).  
Although the specified model does not make any assumption about the data generating process, 
it however needs that the hazards are proportional. The holding of the proportional-hazards 
assumption can be verified with the Grambsch-Therneau P.H. test (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994). 
The estimation of the model parameters and the associated significance tests can be achieved using 
the partial likelihood technique (Cox, 1975). 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Data used to perform the analysis proposed in the present paper concern Italian ISUs and cover 
the period 2009-2018, which corresponds to the period of the Startup Act. In order to avoid spurious 
results, ISUs in agricultural sector have been excluded from the analyses because they are subject to 
a different legislation about business failure. The first five years of time span have been grouped in 
one category, due to the small number of units in each year. The total number of startup companies 
at the end of the period was equal to 9,453. Table 1 reports the total number and the percentage on 
the total of innovative startup companies, distributed by Italian macro-area. At the end of the time 
span, more than half of the startups (55.1%) are located in northern Italy (23.3% in North-East and 
31.8% in North-West), while 20.5% are located in central Italy and only under a quarter (24.4%) in 
southern Italy. Compared to the beginning of the period, the growth in the number of startups has 
involved both northern and southern areas of the country, with only central Italy to have suffered a 
considerable decrease.  
 
 
Table 1: Registered ISUs in Italy by macro-area: numbers (n) and percentages on the total (%) at the end of each year.  
 
 Until to 
12.31.2013 
          
12.31.2014 
       
12.31.2015 
         
12.31.2016 
        
12.31.2017 
        
12.31.2018 
Macro-area n % n % n % n % n % n % 
North-East 113 20.1 388 20.9 786 22.1 1,250 22.9 1,883 23.6 2,207 23.3 
North-West 174 31.0 558 30.0 1,081 30.4 1,707 31.2 2,495 31.3 3,004 31.8 
Center 141 25.1 391 21.0 772 21.7 1,148 21.0 1,636 20.5 1,940 20.5 
South 133 23.7 522 28.1 915 25.7 1,358 24.9 1,959 24.6 2,302 24.4 
Total 561 100 1,859 100 3,554 100 5,463 100 7,973 100 9,453 100 
 
 
 
Regarding the economic sector of activity (according to the NACE classification), most of ISUs 
belong to the service sector, which is the 76.3% of the total startup companies at the end of the 
reference period. The manufacturing sector, with its 18.4% on the total, constitutes a not negligible 
share, while startups operating in tourism and trade form together little more than 5% (Table 2). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Registered ISUs in Italy by macro-sector of activity: numbers (n) and percentages on the total (%) at the end of 
each year.  
 
 Until to 
12.31.2013 
          
12.31.2014 
       
12.31.2015 
         
12.31.2016 
        
12.31.2017 
        
12.31.2018 
Sector n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Manufacturing 95 16.9 326 17.5 631 17.8 1,008 18.5 1,474 18.5 1,736 18.4 
Services 434 77.4 1,437 77.3 2,721 76.6 4,140 75.8 6,053 75.9 7,208 76.3 
Tourism 6 1.1 13 0.7 31 0.9 49 0.9 81 1.0 92 1.0 
Trade 26 4.6 83 4.5 171 4.8 266 4.9 365 4.6 4,17 4.4 
Total 561 100 1,859 100 3,554 100 5,463 100 7,973 100 9,453 100 
 
 
 
The first research question that we aim to address concerns to verify if green innovative startup 
companies have a higher or lower survival performance compared to the non-green innovative 
startups. In order to address this question, we have computed the KM survival curves and 
implemented the Cox Proportional Hazard model. In using the described dataset, we had to deal with 
several missing values in some variables. Therefore, the number of observations varies among the 
different analyses.  
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the KM curves for 9,453 ISUs in Italy in the 2009-2018 period. At 
the estimated survival probability after 8 years of activity for is nearly 57.5%, indicating that more 
than half of the considered companies is still in the market at the end of the observational period. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Kaplan–Meier estimates of survival probability of 9,453 ISUs in Italy for the period 2009–2018. On the x-
axis is reported the time (in number of months) from when a company enters the market, defined as first registration in 
the Italian business register. On the y-axis is reported the cumulative survival probability. Panel (a) shows the Kaplan-
Meier curve for all considered startups, while panel (b) shows Kaplan-Meier curves for green and non-green ISUs 
(Logrank test 𝜒ଶ = 13.7, p-value=0.000). 
 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
 
 
Focusing the attention on comparing green and non-green innovative startups, Figure 1(b) shows 
that the survival performance of the former is very high, so that over 92% of the companies observed 
do not experience the exit from the market. The conducted analysis highlights a clear distinction in 
the performance of green startup companies compared to non-green. In particular, the formers have 
a substantially better survival performance with respect to the latter ones. With a p-value 
approximately equal to zero, the Logrank test shows also that the difference between their survival 
curves is indeed statistically significant. 
This difference, however, could be at least partially due to the particular regulation of the 
innovative startups instead of structural differences between green and non-green companies. In fact, 
since the introduction of regulation 221/2012 and especially from the introduction of regulation 
221/2015 to promote the green economy, considerable benefits are granted to stimulate the run-up to 
sustainability. Innovative startup companies that promote the achievement of this aim may benefit of 
substantial reduction in costs and tax charges, allowing them to not incur in liquidity crisis, 
unsustainable leverage and difficulty in finding funding sources, which are only few examples of 
decisive causes of the premature exit from the market (Stinchcombe, 1965; Baum, 1996, Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Wiklund et al., 2010). 
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This consideration is supported by the results provided by Figure 2, which shows the impact of 
two economic and financial performance measures on the survival of ISUs, that is the return on assets 
(ROA) indicator and the debt-to-equity ratio (D/E). The choice to use these measures to capture the 
effect of the financial characteristics of companies is twofold. Firstly, other items in the financial 
statements had a large number of missing; in fact, it is possible to note that the total number of units 
is lower than that previously used, and startups considered are all born before 2017. Secondly, this 
information will be used as control variables in the following analyses. For both the ROA and D/E 
indicators, firms are grouped into quartiles to simply illustrate the differences between companies 
with higher and lower values (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Panel (a): Kaplan–Meier survival curves of 5,327 ISUs in Italy, born before 2017, analyzed by ROA for the 
period 2009–2018 (Logrank test 𝜒ଶ = 160, p-value=0.000). Panel (b): Kaplan–Meier survival curves of 5,014 ISUs in 
Italy, born before 2017, analyzed by debt to equity ratio for the period 2009–2018 (Logrank test 𝜒ଶ = 41.7, p-
value=0.000). 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Results of the analysis show that companies with a high ability to remunerate assets, have a better 
response in terms of survival probability. Companies with a ROA value located in the third and fourth 
quartiles of the distribution have a survival probability that is never less than 90% in the considered 
period. Concerning the D/E, findings are in line with the literature and highlight how a lower pressure 
of debt on capital favors the chances of survival. Low levels of debt can increase survival probability 
in at least two ways. On one hand, this makes the future cash flows of a company more secure, as 
they will not be absorbed as a priority by the debt holders but can instead be used for normal business 
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operations or further investments (Panno, 2003). On the other hand, companies with a low leverage 
ratio, can look at new debt as a valid path to be taken to meet future needs (Wiklund et al., 2010). 
Therefore, in order to assess the effect of greenness in production on the survival performance of 
innovative startups while controlling for their financial conditions, as measured by ROA and D/E 
indicators, we also fitted a Cox proportional-hazard model. We estimated two models with three 
explanatory variables (Model 1 and Model 2) and we introduced the two control variables, namely 
ROA and D/E, in Model 3. Results of the estimation are reported in Table 3.  
Model 1 has been estimated on the entire dataset covering the entire period, while Model 2 and 
Model 3 have been fitted only on startup companies born before 2017, due to the high number of 
missing elements present in the control variables for the last two years. 
 
 
Table 3: Results from the estimation of Cox proportional hazard models. Coefficients and Standard Errors (in 
parentheses) are reported for each explanatory variable used in the model.  
 
 All companies Companies born before 2017 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
EnergyRelated[YES] -0.79 (0.22)*** -0.72 (0.23)*** -0.63 (0.24)*** 
Industry[Services]  0.35 (0.17)**  0.32 (0.18)*  0.30 (0.19) 
Industry[Tourism]  1.17 (0.41)***  1.17 (0.44)***  0.88 (0.53)* 
Industry[Trade]  0.49 (0.28)*  0.51 (0.29)*  0.43 (0.30) 
ROA[quartile 2]   -0.78 (0.15)*** 
ROA[quartile 3]   -1.87 (0.24)*** 
ROA[quartile 4]   -1.71 (0.22)*** 
Debt2Equity[quartile 2]   -0.12 (0.17) 
Debt2Equity[quartile 3]   -0.84 (0.20)*** 
Debt2Equity[quartile 4]   -0.40 (0.18)** 
YearOfEntry[2014]  0.11 (0.21)   0.11 (0.21)  0.10 (0.21) 
YearOfEntry[2015]  0.73 (0.23)***   0.73 (0.23)***  0.61 (0.23)*** 
YearOfEntry[2015]  0.86 (0.26)***   0.86 (0.26)***  0.67 (0.28)** 
YearOfEntry[2015]  1.49 (0.31)***   
YearOfEntry[2015]  1.06 (0.80)   
Num. obs.  9453   5463  5010 
Missings  5   5  458 
Num. events  294   260  241 
AIC  4695.90   4079.72  3598.62 
Num. events  294   260  241 
PH test  0.90   0.72  0.72 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Being a green ISU positively and significantly influences the survival chances in all the three 
models. In particular, the hazard ratios, computed as an exponential function of the coefficient, reports 
that green startups have a failure rate equal to 53.2% if compared to the others (Model 3) while 
controlling for ROA, D/E and sector of activity. This means that a green company is more than twice 
as likely to survive than a non-green company. 
Moreover, focusing on the sector of activity, both Model 1 and Model 2 report significance of 
coefficients and hazard ratios, indicating a higher probability of leaving the market for services, 
tourism and trade sectors, compared to manufacturing. The result is not surprising, considering that 
the startups operating in the manufacturing sector are those with the most survival chances. 
Although the results are in line with the KM curves, it is necessary to highlight a loss of statistical 
significance of the coefficients introducing the control variables. As ROA increases, the instantaneous 
exit potential decreases. The same consideration may be done for D/E, which seems to have a strongly 
negative impact on the survival performance of innovative startups. 
 Model 3 has the smallest value for the AIC criterion and hence has to be preferred because it has 
a relatively better fit. Finally, the Grambsch-Therneau test (P.H. test) has been also performed to 
assess the hypothesis of proportional hazards assumption. For all three models the P.H. test statics is 
not significant, with an associated p-value greater than 0.10, and hence the proportional hazards 
assumption is respected.  
 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In last twenty years, Western economies have experienced a deep cycle of stagnation. Italy is one of 
the countries most affected by all these issues. Startups may represent a possible key to open the gates 
of recovery, in particular the most innovative ones and those that dedicate the right attention to the 
environment. However, newborn companies may experience a premature failure from the market. 
Hence, the implementation of strong forms of protection to support startups seems to be an 
unavoidable necessity. The present paper aimed at investigating if Italian regulations to boost the 
birth of startups have been successful and if these newborn companies show survival rates different 
from other businesses. Special attention has been dedicated to green startups, in order to understand 
their differences with non-green ones. Data and implemented analyses show that Italian startups 
turning their production to greenness tend to survive longer than their counterparts, leading to 
conclude that attention to the environment and rewards more newborn companies. 
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